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Abstract
This article sets out to consider the extent to which advance
directives can be used as an effective means to entrench personal autonomy, and, in
the light of their statutory form in numerous other jurisdictions, consider the various
approaches which are currently used abroad to determine whether Scotland, which
at present has no legislation entrenching their use, would benefit from such an
approach.
Introduction
Making our own decisions about the type ofmedical treatment
we are to receive, or perhaps more crucially, not receive is a core aspect of the
exercise of personal autonomy. It is now abundantly clear that the concept of
autonomy has become the driver behind contemporary medical practice and
that the exercise of that autonomy is of fundamental importance. For competent,
capable patients, such an exercise is fairly unremarkable. For incompetent, in-
capable patients, it is an impossibility (unless othermeasures have already been
taken) and the best interests test provides a mechanism for determining their
treatment. However, an advance directive can constitute such an ‘othermeasure’
and provide a means by which incompetent and incapable patients can enforce
their autonomous choice to refuse a particular treatment, notwithstanding their
inability to convey their choices at the time of treatment.1 ‘An advance directive
DOI 10.7590/221354013X13823631596237*
The terminology here is somewhat varied; advance ‘directives’, ‘decisions’, and ‘statements’
are all used, although ‘directives’ tend to refer to advance refusals while ‘statements’ tend to
1
be more general. ‘Directives’ is used more commonly in Scotland, while ‘decisions’ is used in
England. This article will use the term ‘advance directives’.
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is, after all, nothingmore or less than the embodiment of the patient’s autonomy
and right of self-determination.’2
But to exercise autonomy, individuals must be able to show that they are legally
competent to make that decision. Decisional competence in the context of end-
of-life healthcare, where continuing capacitymay be in question, has long proved
difficult, whether in relation to immediate or future treatment choices. Individ-
uals with capacity who are about to undergo treatment will be able to refuse
that treatment, even if doing so threatens their life. However, not all such de-
cisions are made in the immediate face of treatment. In certain situations, in-
dividuals may be able to predict loss of capacity due to the progression of their
illness, or may foresee it as a possible eventuality and wish to make decisions
about their future, rather than imminent treatment. The role here of an advance
directive is one which seems initially attractive. It allows individuals to state
that they do not want certain treatment in specified future circumstances. If
those circumstances subsequently arise, after they have lost capacity, then the
directive is intended to stand as their voice and determine the course of action.
This is important because decisions about appropriate treatment still need to
be made despite loss of capacity, and one of the eternal questions is who is best
placed to decide; is it best in the hands of a third party, paternalistic decision-
maker operating on the basis of best interests, or the individual themself via a
prior expression of his or her wishes? The situations where advance directives
could prove useful all share the same core characteristics; they revolve around
someone losing the capacity tomake decisions about their own treatment, either
as a result of a major catastrophic incident, or the inevitable progression of a
disease, or for some other reason. Doctors need to look beyond the physical
individual in order to find someone capable of making that treatment decision.
In the face of loss of individual capacity, a traditionally-accepted route is to look
to the best interests of the patient.3 However, if individuals have previously
contemplated their loss of capacity, there is another option. If they had, while
competent, decided that they did not want certain types of treatment, they may
have drawn up an advance directive as ameans of communicating that decision
into the future, so that it could stand as their voice if they became incapable of
communicating their wishes.
The usefulness of a valid advance directive has been illustrated recently in Re
M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment),4 a case
involving the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally
HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC (Fam) 1017, at para. 37.2
See, for example in the context of PVS patients, Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821
and Law Hospital NHS Trust v. Lord Advocate 1996 SLT 848.
3
[2012] I WLR 1653.4
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conscious woman because it was no longer in her best interests. Although she
had made informal statements about being kept alive artificially, there was no
formal advance directive in place. The Court of Protection specifically noted
that, had the patient executed an advance directive refusing artificial nutrition
and hydration in the circumstances she was now in, the court would have been
required to follow it. However, in the absence of such a directive, the court was
unable to authorise its withdrawal from a minimally conscious patient.5 How-
ever, the importance of capacity at the time of making any advance directive is
fundamental, as is well illustrated by A Local Authority v. E,6 where the Court
of Protection declined to find that E had demonstrated capacity at the point
when she had attempted to execute a valid advance directive. This can be con-
trasted with X Primary Care Trust v. XB,7 where a patient with motor neurone
disease was found to have had capacity at the time that his advance directive
was made. He had been on ventilation for some time and was latterly only able
to communicate by moving his eyes. He had indicated his desire to refuse life-
prolonging measures, even if that resulted in his death, once his disease pro-
gressed to a certain point, and his wife had sourced an advance directive form
from the internet. This had been read to him and he had indicated his agreement
to each of the points. Given that the judge was satisfied that XB had capacity
and that the directive complied with all the requirements of the relevant legis-
lation, it was upheld as valid. As we will see, the common law has developed to
allow for both contemporaneous and advance refusals of treatment at the in-
stance of the patient, and further developments have taken place in some juris-
dictions to specify the formalities for a valid advance directive under statute.
While the common law provided for advance refusal of treatment,8 the intro-
duction of sections 24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 has put advance
directives onto a statutory footing in England and Wales. With them has come
further evidence of the continuing dominance of personal autonomy in the
area of planning for age and future illness. Some of the rationale behind the
introduction of a statutory basis for advance directives in England can be found
in the remarks made at the bill’s second reading.
… under the common law, any one of us could take an advance decision to refuse
treatment now. All of us can do that and we believe that it is right to establish
The patient’s minimally conscious state here distinguished the court’s approach from that as
regards a PVS patient.
5
[2012] EWHC 1639 (COP).6
(2012) 127 B.M.L.R. 122.7
See below.8
87Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2013-2
MAKING TREATMENT DECISIONS FOR THE FUTURE
a framework and to set out the criteria for people who want to take such a de-
cision.9
Other issues which were felt to justify the introduction of these measures in-
cluded a need to present medical staff with a greater degree of certainty about
a patient’s genuine wishes when faced with decisions to withdraw or withhold
life-sustaining treatment, and a desire to alleviate the burden on relatives at a
distressing and difficult time. The GMC also requires doctors to consider ad-
vance care planning with those patients whose gradual loss of capacity is an
unavoidable, or at least reasonably foreseeable, aspect of the progression of
their disease.10 Advance care planning is envisaged here as a wider issue than
simply encouraging the use of an advance directive, and encompasses issues
such as spiritual needs, the place in which patients will be cared for, and the
nature of emergency treatment that may become necessary, as well as discus-
sions about individuals’ wishes in relation to future treatment.
However, this legislative position is not to be found in Scots law. During con-
sultation on the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, the Scottish Exec-
utive took the view that there was no general support to warrant legislating for
advance directives, and that it would be impossible to devise legislation that
covered all eventualities.11 The 2000 Act restricts itself to requiring that the past
and present wishes of the incapable adult be taken into account in any treatment
decision made by medical staff,12 without providing any further measures to
deal withmaking advance directives.While ‘taking account’ of something under
the provisions of the 2000 Act may well mean that the course of action taken
does accord with the patient’s wishes, it does not mandate that a patient’s wish
to refuse particular types of treatment will be acceded to. That refusal would
simply be something taken into account alongside the wishes of relatives,
guardians or attorneys. The only area in which advance directives are specifically
mentioned in Scottish legislative provisions is in respect of mental health
treatment.13This article sets out to consider the extent to which advance directives
can be used as an effective means to entrench personal autonomy, and, in the
David Lammy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, Hansard,
HC Vol. 425, col. 31 (11 October 2004), with reference to the then Mental Capacity Bill.
9
General Medical Council, ‘Treatment and Care towards the End of Life: Good Practice in
Decision-making’, 2010, paras 53, 60, 67-74, www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/end_
of_life_care.asp.
10
Scottish Executive,Making the Right Moves: Rights and Protection for Adults with Incapacity
(Scottish Executive Papers), (Edinburgh: Stationery Office Books, 1999), 6.14.
11
Section 1(4) Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.12
TheMental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 s. 276 requires theMental Health
Tribunal to have regard to the patient’s wishes in respect of their mental health treatment if
those wishes are expressed in a valid advance statement.
13
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light of their statutory form in numerous other jurisdictions, assess the various
approaches which are currently used abroad. These range from provisions
which amount to little more than bare enactments giving statutory authority
for the validity of directives (England), to more extensive legislation explicitly
dealing with a broad range of issues and sometimes including a pro forma
template directive (Queensland). These alternate approaches will be considered
in order to determine whether similar legislation would be of benefit to Scotland,
or whether the current position, where any such expression is one of the factors
taken into account, is a more realistic solution.
Refusal of treatment at common law
Patient autonomy is perhapsmost noticeable when competent
individuals exercise their rights to refuse particular treatments there and then,
against the recommendations of theirmedical team. Refusal of treatment cases
have a lengthy, albeit not initially auspicious, history. One particular context
which has given rise to such issues is the treatment of an adult Jehovah’s Wit-
ness who refuses to consent to procedures that involve the possibility of a blood
transfusion. Re T (adult) (refusal of treatment)14 saw the Court of Appeal uphold
a decision to override the patient’s refusal of a blood transfusion on the grounds
that, while a competent adult had the right to refuse treatment on any basis,
those whose mental capacity was in doubt should be treated to best ensure the
preservation of life. Here, T’s condition following an emergency caesarean
section had deteriorated further and this, coupled with evidence of misinfor-
mation and outside undue influence, allowed the court to determine that her
refusal was invalid. The state’s compelling interest in the preservation of life
was only required to cede in favour of an individual’s unequivocal decision to
refuse treatment, and any ambiguity had to be construed in favour of life.
This situation gives rise to a conflict between two interests, that of the patient
and that of the society in which he lives. The patient's interest consists of his
right to self-determination – his right to live his own life how he wishes, even
if it will damage his health or lead to his premature death. Society’s interest is
in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and that it should be
preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in the ultimate the right
of the individual is paramount. But this merely shifts the problem where the
conflict occurs and calls for a very careful examination of whether, and if so the
way in which, the individual is exercising that right. In case of doubt, that doubt
[1993] Fam 95.14
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falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life for if the individual is to
override the public interest, he must do so in clear terms.15
However, while denying T the right to refuse treatment given that the circum-
stances cast doubt on the validity of that decision, Lord Donaldson did set out
criteria under which an advance refusal of treatment would be valid; the indi-
vidual must have been competent and free from external influence when the
advance decision was taken, must have anticipated the circumstances they are
now in and intended the refusal of treatment to apply to those circumstances.16
This was set out as an absolute right to choose, with one caveat; that it might
not apply in cases where that choice could encompass the death of a viable
foetus. Cases such asRe C (adult: refusal of medical treatment)17 further entrench
the general position taken in Re T, that a competent adult can refuse treatment
for any reason, no matter how apparently unusual. The patient was a paranoid
schizophrenic who refused a life-saving amputation, but was held to be compe-
tent to make such a refusal, despite the fact that many would have disagreed
with his decision. The case goes further still in that his refusal was not simply
a refusal of consent for the immediate situation and proposed amputation, but
for any future interventions as well, and in granting the injunction sought by
C, the judge effectively achieved what theMental Capacity Act has subsequently
brought in. InRe B (adult: refusal of medical treatment)18 the right of a competent
patient to refuse treatment, even where that refusal will lead to his or her death,
was affirmed and this approach has since been further extended to cover the
competent pregnant woman who, despite the existence of her foetus, is as en-
titled to refuse treatment as any other competent adult so long as she has capa-
city.19 Although robust statements are made by the court about the primacy of
autonomous choice, competence is the barrier on this particular road, and while
St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S20 establishes her right to refuse treatment,
it follows a number of earlier cases where that right had been overridden by
the courts on the grounds that the woman lacked capacity, particularly in those
cases where the foetus had yet to be delivered. The difficulty faced by the courts
in these cases has been in accepting the notion that a competent woman would
refuse life-saving treatment in the face of a threat to both herself and her foetus.
However, the current position for pregnant women is the same as for anyone
[1993] Fam 95 at p112, per Lord Donaldson.15
It is worth noting here that these criteria are exactly those which, when translated into a legis-
lative provision, cause difficulties in terms of ensuring the continuing validity of the directive
into the individual’s future.
16
[1994] 1 All ER 819.17
[2002] 2 All ER 449.18
St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1999] Fam 26.19
[1999] Fam 26.20
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else. The competent pregnant woman is allowed to refuse treatment, in just
the sameway as any other competent adult, nomatter how bizarre that decision
may seem to others. The question, as in all cases, is whether the individual has
capacity to make the decision.
Contemporary v. advance refusal
While it is clear that the competent adult, pregnant or not,
can refuse treatment proposed in the immediate or short term for any reason,
there remains a separate issue; whether such a refusal can hold for the future,
specifically for a point in the future when the individual is incapable of either
taking or communicating a decision on treatment. There has been some debate
as to whether the concept of an advance directive can be valid in these circum-
stances, where a previous ‘self’ seeks to exercise its autonomy to bind a future
‘self’ with different priorities and interests,21 but the common law does provide
situations where the law has upheld an advance refusal of treatment. In Re C,
the patient refused both the immediate proposed treatment and any future
attempt to amputate the limb in question. The judgment is recognised as the
first to uphold the validity of, and indeed use the term, advance directive. In Re
AK (medical treatment: consent)22 the patient made an advance refusal of treat-
ment by the only means of communication left to him,23 to the effect that arti-
ficial ventilation should be withdrawn a fortnight after he had lost all means of
communication. It was held that, although emergency situations gave doctors
the right to treat patients who could not consent, that did not apply if it was
already known that the patient did not want such treatment to be provided and
had been competent at the time to take that decision. The judgment in AK
recognised the potential difficulties in ascertaining that the advance wishes
were still reflective of the patient’s views, but determined that to ignore AK’s
clear refusal of treatment when the time camewould have been unlawful. Using
an advance directive to set out a statement of individual choices for future
healthcare is a clear move to extend that individual’s autonomous choices into
a phase of his or her life where it would not otherwise operate, although it does
proceed on an assumption that the individual’s values and beliefs remain as
they were when the directive was made. It comes fraught with difficulties of
specificity; ascertaining whether the individual, who can no longer be asked to
clarify issues, actually wanted a particular provision of the directive to apply to
On this, see for example A.Maclean, ‘Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-making’,
Medical Law Review 14(3): 291; S. Holm, ‘Autonomy, Authenticity or Best Interest: Everyday
21
Decision-making and Persons with Dementia’,Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 4 (2001):
153.
[2001] 1 FLR 129.22
By blinking to indicate ‘yes’ and ‘no’.23
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the precise situation he or she is now in. However, numerous other jurisdictions
have drawn up legislation setting out the parameters of a valid advance directive,
and it is to these that we now turn. While it is notable that attempts to legislate
in this area are sometimes criticised asmisguided, given that legislation cannot
possibly cover all the eventualities involved,24 as long ago as 1995 the Law
Commission acknowledged that legislation could not be expected to resolve all
the difficult questions inherent here. In doing so, it pointed to the role of codes
of practice andmodel forms in providing guidance.25 The statutory formulations
found elsewhere all focus on the same core issues (clarity, competence, appli-
cability) but take quite different approaches as to how to formulate such a
framework. These differences in approach fall into two distinct groups; those
where legislation is sparse in terms of detail and the individual’s voice is amuch
stronger force, and those where the directive follows a template in which the
individual’s voice is (somewhat) lost.
Existing Statutory Approaches to AdvanceDirectives
A variety of jurisdictions have legislated to provide for the
enforceability of valid advance directives and illustrative examples can be found
in England, Australia and the United States.26 These include, respectively, the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (PAA), and
the relevant provisions of theMissouri Revised Statutes, the Illinois LivingWill
Act and the AlabamaNatural Death Act. Through thesemeasures it can be seen
that various approaches are taken to drafting legislation that is designed to
cover the issues, with some core elements being reproduced across legislative
regimes, whereas other issues are alternately dealt with explicitly or left to im-
plication. Differences are also evident in attitudes towards the drafting of such
a document, with some jurisdictions favouring templates while others leave
the issue entirely to the individual. While there is obvious merit in allowing the
individual’s voice to carry through the advance directive (that is, after all, the
point), leaving choice of language and terminology to the individual does raise
the inherent difficulty of ensuring clarity and applicability. This is particularly
the case, given that a lay person will be setting out their wishes for future
For example, Scottish Executive,Making the Right Moves, 6.14 (note 11).24
‘Statutory provisions cannot resolve the problems and questions which may arise in relation
to the validity and applicability of advance refusals. The development of a code of practice and
25
model forms which direct patients towards making the terms of any refusal clear will help to
address the most likely problems’, Law Com No 231 on Mental Incapacity (London: HMSO,
1995) para. 5.22.
Forms of advance directives in use may also include provisions on the appointment of health
care proxies to make decisions on behalf of the individual, but these are not the focus of this
article.
26
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treatment decisions, in a document intended to apply to specific clinical circum-
stances, and to be applied by medical professionals.
England and Wales
The MCA specifies a minimum age of eighteen coupled with
a need to show that the individual was legally competent at the time the directive
was made.27 It defines incapacity very broadly, as an inability to make the de-
cision in question because of a temporary or permanent functional impairment
or disturbance of the mind or brain.28 The explanatory notes to the section list
psychiatric illness, learning disability, dementia, brain injury or toxic confusional
state as possible causes and classifies this as the ‘diagnostic test’. However,
while this appears to be a decidedly clinical definition of incapacity, section 3
goes on to set out the circumstances in which the individual will be deemed
unable to make a decision; where they lack the ability to understand or retain
information relevant to the decision, use or weigh that information as part of
the process of making that decision; or communicate that decision using any
available means. This fits broadly with definitions of capacity under common
law as exemplified by Munby J. in R (on the application of Burke) v. General
Medical Council,29 identifying capacity as grounded in the ability to exercise ra-
tional thought and to process and weigh relevant information in coming to a
decision. It is not necessary that individuals can retain the information long
term, and ‘information relevant to the decision’ is defined to include the rea-
sonably foreseeable consequences of deciding to undergo or reject the treatment,
or ofmaking no decision at all. Equally, since the purpose of an advance directive
is to allow the individual themself to dictate treatment decisions in the future,
should he or she have lost capacity, any subsequent valid conferral of decision-
making authority in respect of those same decisions on another person will
render the directive invalid.30 The subsequent granting of, for example, a lasting
power of attorney is clearly inconsistent with the underlying purpose of an ad-
vance directive and invalidates it. Conversely, it is worth noting that, since an
advance directive is to be viewed as the equivalent of a contemporaneous refusal
by a competent person, it invalidates any previously granted power of attorney.
Similarly, subsequent inconsistent actions will also affect the validity of the di-
rective,31 such as where an individual effects a change of faith which imposes,
Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 s24(1).27
MCA 2005 s2.28
[2005] QB 424 at 440.29
MCA 2005 s25(2)(b).30
MCA 2005 s25(2)(c).31
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or removes, restrictions on treatments but has not revised the directive to reflect
this.32
One of the fundamental aspects of an advance directive is that it is designed to
apply to a future situation in which the individual is no longer capable ofmaking
his or her own contemporaneous decision. Thus, while capacity at the time of
making the directive is vital, the incapacity of the individual at the time when
the directive is to apply is also a key element in assessing applicability.33 Further,
the patient’s advance directive is only applicable if the treatment decision under
discussion is specified in the advance directive.34 A further caveat is introduced
to the effect that subsequent changes in circumstances of which the individual
was not aware at the time ofmaking the directive and which would have affected
the decision if the individual had known of them, also invalidate the directive.35
The longer ago the directive was written, themore likely it is that circumstances
now differ from those envisaged. These would include new treatment options,
but also significant changes in the individual’s personal36 or spiritual life. Di-
rectives that purport to refuse future administration or continuation of life-
sustaining treatmentmust be supported by clear written, signed and witnessed
statements that the directive is to apply even where the consequences of com-
plying with it will be fatal to the individual.37 The directive must also be specific
as to what treatment is to be refused; a general refusal of any and all treatment
at some future point in time will not be sufficient, although descriptions of
what types of treatment are being refused may be couched in lay language.
However, as noted in the Code of Practice,38 some forms of treatment are ex-
cluded from the ambit of advance directives. Thus, basic essential care, which
covers measures including provision of food and hydration by mouth, cannot
be refused; by contrast, artificially administered hydration and nutrition are
classified as life-sustaining treatment and can therefore be rejected under a
written advance directive.
For an example of this type of situation which arose prior to 2005, seeHE v. A Hospital NHS
Trust [2003] EWHC (Fam) 1017, where a woman, born into Islam who had then converted to
32
become a Jehovah’s Witness, had effected a directive refusing blood products. At the relevant
time, she had, however, become engaged to a Muslim, agreed to revert to her former religion
and ceased attending services as a Jehovah’s Witness. It was held that her decision to abandon
her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness was clear and undeniable and that the directive, which she
had not altered, was invalid in the face of her clear and contrary act of reverting to a faith which
did not require the refusal of blood products.
MCA 2005 s25(3).33
Ibid. (4).34
Ibid.35
This would also include a subsequent and unenvisaged pregnancy, on which see later.36
MCA 2005 s.25(5) and (6).37
Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2007), para.
9.28, referring to s.5 of the Act.
38
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Where valid, an advance directive in England takes effect as if the individual
had made the decision contemporaneously.39 However, no liability attaches if
treatment is carried out or continued after the doctor has taken all reasonable
measures to ascertain whether there is a valid, applicable and contrary advance
directive and either does not know or is not satisfied of the existence of any
such directive.40 Doctors are not ‘satisfied’ that a valid and applicable directive
exists if they have genuine doubts about its validity and applicability.41 Equally,
there is no liability if treatment is withdrawn or withheld on the basis of a rea-
sonable belief that there is a valid and applicable advance directive in effect
which requires such withdrawal or withholding.42 However, as noted when the
Mental Capacity Bill went through its second reading,43 there is a difference in
how this protection is applied. Doctors who decide that there is a valid directive
in place and so withdraw or withhold treatment must do so on the basis of a
reasonable belief. Doctors who instigate or continue treatment will only incur
liability if they know or have satisfied himselves that a directive is in place, but
continue nonetheless. It was felt that the greater burden placed on the doctor
who withholds or withdraws treatment meant that the preservation of life was
more effectively enshrined in the legislation.
Under the MCA, a written advance directive is only necessary where the indi-
vidual seeks to refuse life-sustaining treatment,44 and thus any other form of
advance refusal of treatment may be constituted in writing or verbally, as can
any withdrawal or alteration.45However, the Code of Practice recommends that
those treating the patient record any verbal advance directive to avoid potential
confusion at a later date when it is sought to be relied upon.46 It may well be
that those caring for the patient have a fundamental objection in conscience to
honouring the terms of the directive, particularly if the directive envisages the
refusal of life sustaining treatment, which would necessarily involve those
treating the patient in providing basic and palliative care only, while watching
a medically avoidable death ensue. No right of conscientious objection exists
ex facie under the MCA but the Code of Practice, which sets out how the Act
should be implemented, allows for an exercise of conscience on the part of the
MCA 2005, s.26(1).39
Ibid. (2).40
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (note 38) para. 9.58.41
MCA 2005, s.26(3).42
Lammy, Hansard, HC Vol. 425, col. 31 (note 9). See also S. Michalowski, ‘Advance refusals of
life-sustaining treatment: the relativity of an absolute right’,Modern Law Review 68, no. 6
(2005): 958 at 960.
43
MCA 2005 ss25(5) and (6).44
MCA 2005 s.24(5), unless the alteration is such as to make the directive applicable to life-
sustaining treatment.
45
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (note 38), para. 9.22-9.23.46
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treating clinician, so long as the patient is transferred to the care of a colleague.47
This accords with an interpretation of the right to autonomy, which includes a
caveat that it cannot be exercised in such a way as to harm others, and mirrors
the position in, for example, abortion cases. Giving those with principled objec-
tions to withholding treatment which could otherwise extend the patient’s life
the right to pass the patient’s care to a colleague, rather than be faced with a
choice between illegal action and subjectively immoral action, avoids a situation
where the patient’s autonomous right to determine treatment harms those in
charge of providing that treatment.
The United States
It is, perhaps, not surprising that American jurisdictions can
field some of the most comprehensive legislative exemplars in this field, given
that the concept of an advance directive has its origins there.48Missouri49 adopts
the pro forma approach, providing a template, should individuals wish to use
it, which can be added to with further specific (and severable) instructions at
the granter’s discretion. It is formulated to cover the withdrawal or withholding
of death-prolongingmeasures when individuals are suffering a terminal condi-
tion and unable tomake contemporaneous decisions, thereby allowing individu-
als to specify circumstances in which they do not wish their life to be extended
further. Treatment designed to be palliative is not encompassed in any such
refusal, and neither is the provision of artificial hydration or nutrition, or any
deliberate course of action which hastens death. Instead, the refusal envisaged
here is an advance refusal of treatment that is purely designed to hold off death
which would otherwise occur. The pro forma directive itself is short; a single
paragraph, which is to be signed, dated and witnessed, and provides a section
to allow for its later revocation by the granter. The legislation goes on to deal
with other issues, requiring that those treating the patient do not act contrary
to the directive unless they have a ‘serious reason … consistent with the best
interests’ of the patient.50What these ‘serious reasons’ might be is not specified,
and this appears to allow a best interests (paternalistic) determination to overrule
the autonomous advance decision of the patient. It further specifies the need
for competence on the part of the individual at the time ofmaking the directive,
and that ‘advanced age’ per se will not be sufficient to dislodge the presumption
of competence.51 Although Missouri adopts the statutory recognition approach
taken by England, the scope of a Missouri directive is quite different. Most
Ibid., paras 9.61-63.47
L. Kutner, ‘The Living Will: A Proposal’, Indiana Law Journal 44 (1969): 539.48
Missouri Revised Statutes, ss459.010-055.49
S459.025.50
S459.035.51
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notably, it only applies when the individual is terminally ill, and only allows for
a direction to withhold or withdraw death-prolonging procedures. This makes
it considerably more restrictive in approach and, arguably, far less of a means
of upholding the broader concept of individual autonomous choice.
The Illinois Living Will Act52 again refers to the advance refusal of death
delaying procedures in the context of terminal conditions. Death delaying pro-
cedures are defined as those which will do no more than put off the inevitable
moment of death (as opposed to palliative measures), and a non-exhaustive list
of procedures is identified, which includes artificial ventilation and intravenous
feeding.53 Artificial nutrition and hydration may not be withdrawn or withheld
if that would, in itself, cause death by starvation or dehydration, rather than as
a result of the terminal condition. Again, a short pro forma version of the direc-
tive is included. This too is fairly restrictive in comparison with the MCA, al-
though in contrast to the Missouri provisions, it does allow patients to state in
advance that they wish to have artificial feeding measures withdrawn. The
AlabamaNatural Death Act54 applies in cases where the individual is terminally
ill or permanently unconscious and covers advance refusal of medical proce-
dures, life-sustaining treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration (where
this is set out specifically). It also provides a considerably longer pro forma di-
rective to be signed, dated and witnessed. The pro forma sets out each of the
applicable conditions (terminal illness or permanent unconsciousness) sepa-
rately, and specifically includes a section for other directions to be added by the
individual, as well as including a section dealing with the appointment of a
proxy decision-maker. These provisions go markedly further than those in
Missouri or Illinois, to the extent that they apply beyond situations of terminal
illness. However, their scope is only extended to cover permanent unconscious-
ness, and thus they are still significantly more limited that the MCA. The oper-
ation of a directive is also nullified for the duration of a patient’s pregnancy.
Alongside legislative pro forma, Aging with Dignity55 provide a template for an
advance directive (‘Five Wishes’) which can be used in the majority of states.
This is much more detailed. It allows for both the appointment of a proxy and
advance refusals of treatment, and incorporates elements of explanation of the
decisions being made, in lay terms. It details specific types of situations in
which the individual may wish to refuse treatment and allows individuals to
specify the nature of comfort and personal care they wish to receive, as well as
755 Illinois Compiled Statutes 35/1.52
Ibid. 35/2(d).53
Code of Alabama, s.22-8A-1.54
www.agingwithdignity.org.55
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how they wish to be treated and how much they want relatives to be told about
their condition. It is, in comparison to even the longer legislative pro formas,
an extensive document which deals with the social, psychological and spiritual
side of approaching death, as well as the medical. In practical terms, the feasi-
bility of complying with all the specific elements which the individualmay have
set out is relatively burdensome on hospital staff, but as a means of allowing
individuals to express their autonomous choices in advance of their incapacity,
it is a thorough and determined attempt to enhance autonomous choice.
Queensland
While the English legislation sets out a broad framework but
leaves the responsibility for content and phrasing to the individual, Queensland
presents a quite different approach to providing for advance directives. In terms
of statutory provisions, as well as enabling legislation, a non-mandatory pro
forma advance directive is provided under section 44(2) of the Powers of Attor-
ney Act 1998.56 Its scope is wider than that found in other pro formas, in that
it applies to both future refusals of treatment and to the giving of prospective
consent to future treatment,57 but as noted on the pro forma itself, while there
is an entitlement to refuse treatment, there is no guaranteed entitlement to insist
on specific treatment despite having already consented to it. It also takes pre-
cedence over any power of attorney. Capacity is defined under schedule 3 of the
PAA as encompassing the ability to understand the nature and effect of a de-
cision, freely make that decision and communicate it in some way,58 and thus
requires broadly the same core elements for validity as a common law directive.
Statutory advance directives take effect once the adult granter has lost capacity
in a relevant respect, but any refusal of life-sustaining treatment can only take
effect if either the granter has an incurable, irreversible, terminal condition and
death is expected within a year, or is in a persistent vegetative state, or perman-
ently unconscious, or is suffering such a severe illness or injury that he or she
is not expected to recover sufficiently to be able to have the life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn. This represents a significant limitation compared with
the English approach which allows treatment to be refused regardless of the
individual’s underlying condition. It is also acceptable to withdraw artificial
nutrition and hydration, where providing such would be contrary to good
practice.59 The Act goes on in later sections to provide for relief from liability
where the health care provider did not know about the directive, or where it
Directives not following this format remain valid under the common law, so long as capacity
and voluntariness are established, following basic principles from English common law.
56
PAA 1998 s.35(2).57
This bears some similarity to the test set out under s.3 of the MCA in England.58
PAA s.36(2)(b).59
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failed to act in accordance with the directive because it had good reason to believe
it was uncertain, inconsistent with good practice or that circumstances had
changed in ways which made compliance with the directive inappropriate.60
This last caveat raises interesting questions; it is phrased in ways resonant with
theMCA, except that theMCAwould invalidate a directive where circumstances
had changed in ways which the granter of the directive had not envisaged
(therefore making the change in circumstances relevant where it would have
affected the subjective viewpoint of the granter). Here, the PAA envisages the
directive becoming invalid where compliance with it had become inappropriate,
through a change in circumstances, which specifically includes developments
in medical technology. This presupposes that a decision that the directive is no
longer to be complied with could be based on the assessment of its continued
suitability as made by persons other than the granter. This in turn raises ques-
tions about the statutory form of a directive in Queensland and the extent to
which it is genuinely a vehicle for continued patient autonomy. The availability
of a (fairly lengthy) pro forma is an interesting alternative and potentially
addresses at least some of the issues around clarity and ambiguity, if a largely
standardised format is employed. If, however, the purpose of an advance direc-
tive is to allow the individual to ‘speak’ through it, then a document in a specified
format where the individual has filled in the blanks could detract from its role
as a genuine expression of individual choice.
The United Nations
TheUnited Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) was ratified by the UK Government in 2009. Article 12 as-
serts equal recognition before the law for persons with disabilities, and recog-
nises their equal right to legal capacity. It further sets out that appropriate
measures shall be taken to allow persons with disabilities to access whatever
support mechanisms might be necessary to allow them to exercise that legal
capacity. In doing so, it puts the focus on individual autonomy with the addition
of what might be termed ‘assisted autonomy’, in place of themore paternalistic
‘best interests’ approach. As Dinerstein notes: ‘…supported decision making,
which Article 12 embraces, retains the individual as the primary decisionmaker,
while recognising that the individual with a disability may need some assistance
– and perhaps a great deal of it – in making and communicating a decision’.61
It is clear that what is envisaged for persons with disabilities is access to a range
of whatever support is necessary for them, given their specific disability. While
PAA 1998 ss102 and 103.60
R. Dinerstein, ‘Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the
Rights of PersonswithDisabilities: TheDifficult Road fromGuardianship to SupportedDecision
Making’,Human Rights Brief 19, no. 2 (2012): 8 at 10.
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that range could encompass all manner of practical issues and the provision of
support or assistance by other people, it seems clear to us that a further way of
envisaging such support would be to encourage the use of advance directives
by those who can envisage disability at a future point. For those persons facing
a diagnosis of an illness which will, at a later date, render them disabled and
incapable of communicating a decision, an advance directive can be seen as a
way of providing support to their future selves by communicating in advance
their decisions about treatment. However, the ambit of Article 12 is muchmore
extensive. It applies to all persons with disabilities. In the context of our discus-
sion here, the individual we posit is one who has capacity but foresees at time
when that will be lost, and wants to plan in advance for that eventuality. How-
ever, the CRPD has much greater significance for those persons who are cur-
rently disabled, for whom it establishes a right to exercise capacity that will re-
quire a root and branch change in how capacity and autonomy are currently
conceptualised. The UK’s initial report on its implementation of the CRPD62
talks in terms of thosemeasures which have already been set out in the existing
legislation. While these measures do indeed provide assistance to those who
need supported decision making, it seems to us that it what is still lacking is
the more explicit and fundamental recognition of the equal right to exercise
legal capacity which will require a re-envisioning of how we understand the
notion of capacity and autonomous choice. While this, and the allied notion of
what we understand about identity when tied to autonomy, is a highly significant
issue, it is beyond the scope of our discussions for this article.
However, in respect of the situations under discussion, where individuals who
currently have capacity can contemplate a future disability, advance directives
do seem to us to have a role in assisting them to make decisions in the future
by setting out their wishes in advance. To have a role as a support measure in
this way, advance directives need to be placed on a clear footing, and be made
easy and accessible to individuals. This again turns us back to the issue of the
approach to their formulation. In terms of the various approaches to the statutory
formulation of advance directives, the English approach is one of the most
flexible, allowing for the individual to refuse, in advance, any proposed treatment
so long as the requirements of the MCA are followed. Other approaches limit
the individual’s ability to refuse in one or more ways, by limiting the types of
condition which the patient must be in (terminal, permanently unconscious,
not pregnant) before the directive will take effect, or the types of treatment that
can validly be refused. If a more flexible model were to be sought for Scotland,
the MCA offers a clear example of such an approach which upholds the indi-
Available at www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/SPReports.aspx. Accessed 25 July
2013.
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vidual’s autonomous right to choose in all circumstances, so long as the directive
is valid. However, the MCA does lack the standardised statutory pro forma
found in numerous other jurisdictions. While such pro formas have their lim-
itations, there is something to be said for a standardised form. It has the benefit
of being easily accessible, whichmay encourage uptake, and of being consistent,
which would make it increasingly familiar to clinicians who come across it at
the bedside. It also avoids the problems inherent in allowing lay individuals to
draw up directions themselves, without understanding the technical language.
Scotland
There is as yet no specific enabling legislation in Scotland that
covers the use of advance directives by individuals who want to direct the future
course of their treatment themselves. The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland)
Act 2000 sets out guiding principles for any intervention in the life of an inca-
pable adult and states, in section 1(4), that the present and past wishes and
feelings of that adult shall be taken into account. These may be ascertained by
any method. This allows for a previously drafted advance directive to be taken
into account in determining the nature of a medical intervention at a later date,
but it requires that such wishes are taken into account alongside the views of
relatives, guardians, welfare attorneys and such like, without stating any order
of priority and thus does not allow the previously expressed wishes of the indi-
vidual to necessarily determine the course of action. The 2000Act has an accom-
panying Code of Practice63 which classifies an advance statement refusing
specified treatment as an advance directive and indicates that such a document
is potentially binding. It notes that an advance statement would be a ‘strong
indication’ of the patient’s past wishes but should not be taken in isolation,
without consideration of other factors including its age, relevancy to the patient’s
current situation, medical advancements that may have affected the patient’s
view, and the patient’s current wishes (presumably if able to express them).
This is reflective of many of the points raised in the MCA, but the Code itself
notes that it is not mandatory.64 Further reference to the concept of an advance
directive can be found in NHS Scotland’s policy on non-resuscitation65 which
allows a valid advance refusal of CPR to establish circumstances under which
it should not be undertaken. It also contemplates discussion with the patient
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 Part 5 Code of Practice, 2nd ed. (Scottish Govern-
ment, 2008), para. 2.30.
63
Codes of Practice are authoritative statements in their field, offering guidance on good practice
but are not generally legally enforceable. Here, part 2 of the Code (para. 2.1) states that it sets
64
out the relevant statutory rules followed by guidance on good practice and para. 2.30 falls under
the latter.
NHS Scotland ‘DoNot Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Integrated Adult Policy’, 2010,
www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/05/24095633/7.
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about the role of a directive if it is anticipated that the patient could go into arrest.
Thus, while there is some recognition of the relevance of a patient’s prior ex-
pressed wishes in Scotland, the law is considerably less formalised than in
other jurisdictions. The question, then, is whether this is a better position, and
whether, given some of the problematic issues – to which we now turn – Scots
law would benefit from a legislative framework.
Some Problem Areas – The Pregnant Woman and the
Intention that the Directive should Apply to Subsequent
Circumstances
Directives are only valid if they are applicable to the circum-
stances which have subsequently arisen. This is evident through both common
law and statutory formulations and allows medical staff to treat in accordance
with the best interests of the incapax, on the grounds that the patient’s prior
expressed wishes do not cover the current situation. It is clear that, if the cir-
cumstances are genuinely not those which appear in the directive (for example
where certain treatments have been refused if the individual is terminally ill,
but in fact that individual is brought into hospital unconscious but not terminal),
the directive should not apply. However, there are situations which raise issues
of greater complexity. An issue of particular difficulty is whether the existence
of a foetus at any particular stage of development should invalidate the individu-
al’s advance directive. This takes us back to the fraught issue of foetal rights
and the extent to which a developing but unborn foetus can impact on the rights
of the autonomous woman who carries it. Identifying pregnancy as a change
in circumstances which is sufficient to invalidate a directive is a means of en-
suring that the duty to preserve life is upheld, but would involve disregarding
advance directives refusing life-sustaining treatment made by any woman of
childbearing age, should they come to be relied upon at a future date when she
is pregnant.
In some jurisdictions, while the legislation does not ex facie provide that an
advance directive is automatically invalidated by virtue of a subsequent preg-
nancy, it would be possible for a doctor to regard that subsequent pregnancy
as a change in circumstances which the individual had not contemplated and
which could have made a difference to her advance refusal of treatment, thus
giving grounds to disregard the directive and continue or initiate the life-sus-
taining treatment.66 Indeed the English Code of Practice specifically recom-
mends that individuals include directions on possible future circumstances,
citing the issue of a future pregnancy as an example. However, the position in
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (note 38) para. 9.16.66
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England does not go so far as to say that a subsequent pregnancy automatically
voids an advance directive, and thus, if a woman had contemplated it as a pos-
sibility for her future, and specified that her refusal of life-sustaining treatment
should apply notwithstanding any future pregnancy, that would amount to a
valid directive. The woman in question needs to state that she is rejecting life-
sustaining treatment even in circumstances where its removal would put ‘life’
at risk (specifically defined to cover both her and her foetus’ life).67 In contrast,
many US states specify in their advance directive legislation that any directive
refusing life-sustaining treatment is not to apply if the individual is pregnant
at the relevant later date or, in some states, if that pregnancy has passed the
point of viability.68 The first of these two approaches raises an interesting
problem. If the pregnant woman is competent to take her own decisions, reaches
a particular stage of pregnancy and decides to abort, then providing that the
jurisdiction in question allows abortion at that stage, she has a right to access
abortion services, and the foetus’ ‘right’ to life is automatically defeated by her
autonomous choice exercised within those legislative limits. However, imagine
a woman who had previously drawn up a valid advance directive stating that
she no longer wanted life-sustaining treatment if she had been comatose on
life support for eight weeks. If at a future date she lapsed into a coma, required
life-sustaining measures but was also discovered to be pregnant, the situation
would be quite different. The existence of her foetus would, under jurisdictions
that disapply directives on evidence of pregnancy, defeat her earlier directive.
Thus, while competent, she could choose to undertake an autonomous course
of action which would result in the termination of the life of her foetus, but
while incompetent, even after having drawn up a directive, those wishes in re-
spect of her own life would be defeated by the existence of the foetus. That
foetus would suddenly gain a standing and a level of protection, by virtue of its
mother’s incompetence, which it would not otherwise have had.Whilemeasures
that limit access to abortion as pregnancy advances are evidence of the interplay
and shifting balance between female autonomy and the state’s obligation to
protect life, a measure which defeats the operation of her autonomy simply by
virtue of the foetus’ existence, at a point when it is not afforded legal protection
against being aborted, is a curiousmeasure. Of the three options (that pregnancy,
or post-viability pregnancy invalidate a directive or that, in contrast, a directive
overrides any consideration of the foetus), the middle ground at least has some
MCA s.25 Explanatory Notes s.89.67
See, for example, Missouri (Revised Statutes Title 31 §459.025) and Alabama (Code §22-8A-
4(e)) and where pregnancy invalidates the directive. In Oklahoma (Code §63-3101.8C), the
68
directive is similarly invalid unless the individual has specified that life-sustaining measures
should be withdrawn notwithstanding any future pregnancy. Colorado (Revised Statutes §15-
18-104(2)) and Illinois (Compiled Statutes Chapter 755, §35/3(c)) both view a pregnancy which
has passed the point of viability as invalidating the directive.
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congruity with the position on the protection of the foetus in the context of
abortion.
TheMCA does not specifically state that pregnancy overrides any existing direc-
tive but does, as noted, allow for an unanticipated chance in circumstances to
do so. Thus the English courts faced with a pregnant woman could classify the
existence of her foetus as an unanticipated circumstance which would have
made her rethink her directive. However, the concomitant Code of Practice for
England and Wales specifically recommends that individuals specify circum-
stances which they can envisage arising, and that they state in the directive
whether it is to apply. This implies that they have the freedom to assert that a
particular circumstance is not to affect the applicability of the directive. So, for
example, the woman here could write into her directive, which refused life-
sustaining treatment, that it was to apply notwithstanding any subsequent
pregnancy and thus defeat attempts by the courts or her doctors to override her
autonomous choice by appealing to her changed circumstances. The woman
who did not make provision for such future possibility might lose the
autonomous rights she had striven to protect by virtue of her advance directive.
Pregnancy is perhaps a unique change in circumstances, as women making
advance directives while of childbearing age would be more likely to consider
the possibility that, whether at present they do or do not wish to conceive,
pregnancy will remain an ongoing possibility until they reach the menopause
and thus would be more likely to deal with that possibility in drafting their di-
rective. However, subsequent pregnancy is not the only situation that can give
rise to an unanticipated future circumstance.
Further Problem Areas – Other Unanticipated Changes in
Circumstances
It has been stated consistently that one of the purposes of an
advance directive is to extend autonomy beyond the reaches of an individual’s
capacity. However, the issues which surround the acceptance and application
of a directive cast doubt on how firmly this extension of autonomy is entrenched
in practice. Patients may only exercise their right of autonomy if they were
competent at the time to make the directive, and if the directive remains valid
at the point of its subsequent implementation. The more courts are able to use
either statutory or common law frameworks to find either of these missing, the
easier it is (hollowly) to trumpet the patient’s right to autonomy, because in the
circumstances, the duty to preserve life will win in any case. Since the English
legislation has yet to be relied on in respect of subsequent changes in circum-
stances, it remains to be seen how the courts might approach implementing
the statutory framework they have been given. Provisions such as section 25(2)(c)
of the MCA, which specify that the directive is not valid if the patient has done
anything ‘clearly inconsistent’ with the view that the directive continues to
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represent their wishes, allow an element of subjective assessment to be brought
in, whereby courts could interpret actions as invalidating the directive without
evidence of actual revocation by the individual. Section 25(4)(c) allows for the
directive to be overridden where ‘there are reasonable grounds for believing
that circumstances exist which [the patient] did not anticipate at the time of the
advance decision and which would have affected his decision had he anticipated
them’. The classification of a circumstance as one which would have affected
the individual’s decisions had he or she known about them is difficult. The ex-
planatory notes which accompany the MCA mention significant changes in
available medications and treatments for particular conditions which, since the
time the directive was drafted, have fundamentally altered the prognosis for
the individual and made continued treatment less of a burden. This could es-
tablish that there were reasonable grounds to believe that unanticipated circum-
stances now existed which would have affected the individual’s decisions.
However, the nature of ‘reasonableness’ in this context is unclear. While a
doctor or judge may feel that a particular new drug clearly makes living with a
particular condition bearable and ‘worthwhile’, it is exactly that determination
made for an individual by others, and the usurpation of personal autonomy,
which the concept of an advance directive seeks to avoid. This issue – of
whether a directive can or should apply if circumstances have unfurled in ways
which the individual did not contemplate – is one which has been raised in the
philosophical literature on this subject.
A criticism of advance directives put forward by Dresser is that the content of
the directive will necessarily be insufficiently informed (given that it will play
out in the future) and that the context in which the incapax is now situated may
be very different from that initially envisaged.69 Autonomous choice exercised
contemporaneously by the competent individual requires that the decision be
made in the light of all the relevant information, even if the decision once taken
is open to being viewed by others as irrational in that context. If directives are
to be relied upon as prior expressions of autonomous choice, then they too
should be informed decisions. However, there is an obvious temporal problem
here. The directive would have been made some time previously – anything
from a few days to many years. The shorter the time period between drafting
and implementation, themore likely the directive is to be sufficiently informed.
However, Dresser argues that, at the date at which the directive is to be imple-
mented, relevant factors may be very different from how they were at the point
when it was drafted, and that this diminishes the moral weight of the directive.
This would then suggest that other decision-making factors should be brought
R. Dresser, ‘Precommittment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity’, Texas
Law Review 81 (2003): 1823 at 1839.
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into play, such as best interests, in order to protect the now vulnerable and in-
competent patient. Her argument is that the patient’s own prior and well-inten-
tioned decisions may turn out to be harmful to the patient in the future when
they come to take effect, such as when a treatment refused at the time of drafting
now turns out to have clear benefits for the patient. ‘Just as an advance directive
may not bind physicians to perform active euthanasia, because this choice is
contrary to existingmedical conventions, a directive should not bind physicians
to decisions that would clearly harm incompetent patients.’70 In effect, her ar-
gument envisages a situation where patients need protection from the terms
of their advance directive because they have become their own worst enemies.
Looking at the English formulation in the light of the above criticism, it can be
seen that provision is made in section 25(4)(c), whereby one of the statutory
reasons for overriding a directive is that ‘there are reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that circumstances exist which [he] did not anticipate at the time of the
advance decision and which would have affected his decision had he anticipated
them’.71 The Explanatory Notes to the Act go on to elucidate this and cite new
medications or treatment for a condition which significantly alter the patient’s
outlook or reduces his or her burden. Thus, under English law, any directive
drafted at a timewhen treatment was unavailable or ineffectual and burdensome
in itself, would be invalid if, at the point when it was to be implemented, some
new treatment had become available which would dramatically improve the
patient’s condition. This answers Dresser’s concern that patients’ own prior
decisions could end up depriving them of the best clinical care at a later date,
when medicine has moved on. In this respect, the two variants above strike a
balance between allowing the patient’s autonomous voice to be heard and
accepting that, in some circumstances, the passage of time will have rendered
that prior decision a less clear indication of what the patient would have wanted
had he or she been able to make a contemporaneous decision. Inevitably, this
means blurring the picture and generating a situation where, in some cases,
best interests will defer to autonomous choice, whereas in others (although
perhaps less often) best interests will rule the day because the directive will be
invalidated by subsequent developments. This could be seen as a necessary evil
in recognition of the fact that the exercise of autonomy is a process by which
individuals who are informed of their situationmakes decisions about the course
of their lives. On the other hand, this approach (disapplying the directive if future
advances mean it is – in medical opinion – no longer valid) denies the very ex-
pression of autonomy that directives are intended to enshrine.
Ibid. 1847.70
MCA s.25(4)(c).71
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What, Then, Can be Said for the Current Scottish
Approach?
As noted at the outset, the legislative regime in Scotland does
not provide statutory recognition for advance directives, although there is an
assumption that common law acceptance as demonstrated through the English
courts would hold sway. Section 1(4) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland)
Act 2000 states that the past and present wishes of the patient must be taken
into account inmaking any treatment decision. Beyond that, the accompanying
Code of Practice states that advance directives are potentially binding and that
a doctor should take legal advice before proceeding to treat in the face of a
contrary directive.72 However, none of this goes as far as the advance directive
legislation considered above. The question then becomes whether the current
Scottish position is sufficient for the needs of both patients and medical staff.
Under the provisions of the MCA in England, a patient with a progressive
neurological condition, who felt that there were situations where life would not
be a blessing, could draw up an advance directive specifying certain future
scenarios in which he or she would not want treatment to be continued. If validly
executed, such patients would be able, in most cases, to rely on the future im-
plementation of their wishes, were they no longer competent to refuse treatment
at the time. In Scotland, those same patients could still draw up advance direc-
tives but would have no assurance that these would necessarily be followed. It
is perfectly possible to argue that it would be rare for a doctor to continue to
treat their patient in the face of a clear expression of the patient’s prior contrary
wishes. However, the value of advance directives can be identified at two separate
points in time. They have value at the point when treatment is being considered,
as themeans of providing clear and convincing evidence of patients’ ownwishes
and allowing the extension of their autonomous choice beyond their capacity
to communicate those choices. But they also have value at the point when they
are drawn up, potentially years in advance of their implementation, when they
give the patient the reassurance and comfort that comes from knowing that
they have done what is necessary to ensure their wishes are fulfilled, and the
sense of control that is achieved by this extension of autonomy.
While advance directives have an intuitive appeal, and certainly appear to satisfy
the increasing demands of individual autonomy, significant questions remain
about their feasibility as a solution to the problem of deciding treatment in the
face of a loss of capacity. There certainly leave a number of core problems in
their wake. At a prosaic level, are they capable of being stored safely enough to
remain intact for as long as they may be needed? Are they capable of being
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 Part 5 Code of Practice para. 2.30 (2008).72
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stored somewhere, or somehow, that will ensure that medical staff have access
to them at the relevant time (particularly when that could be in an emergency,
many decades in the future)? At a more substantive level, are they ever capable
of being drafted sufficiently precisely to meet the legal requirements imposed
on them? Given that an advance directive is intended to be projections of the
individual’s voice, thrown out into his or her own incapacitated future, it may
seem sensible to allow that individual to speak for themself. Yet legal tests that
require the future situation and proposed treatment to match that postulated
in the directive require a degree of precision, not to say crystal ball gazing, that
is hard to achieve. And at the conceptual level, is it ever possible to bind a future
version of yourself? If, in the future, you have lost capacity, rational ability, the
faculty of memory and experience, are you still sufficiently the same person to
allow the earlier directive to be viewed as granted by you, and binding on you?
And as a corollary to that, are ‘you now’ actually well placed to know what is
best for ‘you in the future’? While ‘you now’ can – in at least some situations –
be said to be best placed to decide what is in your current interests (and indeed
this is the crux of the autonomy argument), who is to say that ‘you now’ know
what will be best for ‘you in the future’? Given that ‘you now’ cannot knowwhat
situation that ‘future you’ will be in, or what interests or values ‘future you’ will
have, can ‘you now’ decide in the present what will be for the best in some in-
determinate situation which has yet to arise?
There are, however, broadly two different broad of situation that a doctor
presented with an incompetent patient and an advance directive could face. At
one end of the spectrum are terminally-ill individuals who are aware of the
nature and course of their disease, and have put in place measures to deal with
the final phase of their lives and their imminent death. At the other end are
individuals who was suddenly struck down but have previously drawn up direc-
tives to cover future events that they have envisaged might happen to them.
The problem of current and future versions of yourself aremuch less significant
in the former case. While there may be a place for advance directives for those
whose death is more imminent and whose prognosis more predictable, they
perhaps fail, in the light of the difficulties already outlined, to have a more
generic place as a tool through which future care planning can be absolutely pre-
determined by the individual. As such, it is argued that, while it would be possible
to put directives on a statutory footing in Scotland, it could not then be assumed
that all individuals who used that legislation and sought to formalise their views
on future treatment would be able to rely on a guarantee of its future applica-
bility. Just as in other jurisdictions, the passage of time and advent of unexpected
circumstances will defeat any attempt, under any legal framework, to ensure
the future applicability of current wishes. Advance directives cannot hope to
cast out far into a speculative future and still guarantee their applicability regard-
less of the passage of time and the mutability of circumstances. It may well be
that, despite valiant attempts to set out legislative frameworks for advance direc-
Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2013-2108
CHRISTIE AND ANDERSON
tives, for some patients they will always promise rather more than they are
capable of achieving.
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